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Abstract
We consider a framework involving behavioral economics and machine learning.
Rationally inattentive Bayesian agents make decisions based on their posterior
distribution, utility function and information acquisition cost (Rényi divergence
which generalizes Shannon mutual information). By observing these decisions,
how can an observer estimate the utility function and information acquisition cost?
Using deep learning, we estimate framing information (essential extrinsic features)
that determines the agent’s attention strategy. Then we present a preference based
inverse reinforcement learning algorithm to test for rational inattention: is the agent
an utility maximizer, attention maximizer, and does an information cost function
exist that rationalizes the data? The test imposes a Rényi mutual information
constraint which impacts how the agent can select attention strategies to maximize
their expected utility. The test provides constructive estimates of the utility function
and information acquisition cost of the agent. We illustrate these methods on a
massive YouTube dataset for characterizing the commenting behavior of users.
1 Introduction
Suppose a Bayesian agent chooses an action at each time instant to maximize an expected utility
function based on the noisy measurement of an underlying state. Assume that obtaining this noisy
measurement is expensive – this information acquisition cost affects the action chosen by the agent.
An observer records the dataset of actions of the Bayesian agent and knows the underlying state. How
can the observer estimate the utility function and information acquisition cost of the agent given this
dataset? Our aim is to construct preference based inverse reinforcement learning algorithms to obtain
set valued estimates of the utility and information acquisition cost that are consistent with the dataset.
Our methodology stems from behavioural economics and machine learning: non-parametric esti-
mation of utility functions and feature extraction using deep clustering to construct behavioural-
economics based models for Bayesian agents. Let us briefly explain these two aspects. Estimating
utility functions given a finite length time series of decisions is well studied in the area of revealed
preferences in economics [36, 41] and more recently in machine learning. Also, costly information
acquisition by Bayesian agents has been studied by economists and psychologists under the area
of “rational inattention” pioneered by Sims [30, 31]. Rational inattention is a form of bounded
rationality - the key idea is that human attention spans for information acquisition are limited and can
be modelled in information theoretic terms as a Shannon capacity limited communication channel.
However, modelling the information acquisition process is complicated in our case by framing. In
behavioural economics, Kahneman uses “frames” to describe information an agent has when making
a decision. For example, when selecting which product to purchase on a website, the positioning of
the products and surrounding content on the website impacts how humans select a product. Given
external information (image/text/numeric) in which the decision problem is embedded, how can one
construct a tractable feature set? We develop deep embedded clustering methods to construct the
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frames to test for rational inattentive agents. The deep embedded clustering is based on [42, 12],
however we design the input, encoder, and decoder to account for the visual perception of the frame
of the decision problem which includes image, text, and numeric information.
Context: (i) Rational Inattention & Inverse Reinforcement Learning. Sim’s rational inattention model
is studied extensively in behavioral economics [24]. Woodford [41] considered an upper bound on
the Shannon capacity for testing rational inattention with visual perception queues. Typically, the
information acquisition costs faced by a decision maker are not known to the observer. A general test
for rational inattention is proposed in [6, 5] with minimal restrictions on the information acquisition
cost. The two significant extensions considered in this paper are the effects of framing (determined
using deep embedded clustering) and the use of Rényi mutual information cost constraints for testing
rational inattention. Our rational inattention test is equivalent to solving the temporal credit assignment
problem in preference-based inverse reinforcement learning [39]. Such inverse reinforcement learning
is used with non-numeric feedback [40], e.g. in socially adaptive path planning [19, 13] for robots.
Context: (ii) YouTube Application. We will use rational inattention and framing (with deep learning)
on a massive YouTube data set to analyse the commenting behaviour of users in YouTube. Extensive
studies [18, 22, 1] show that comments posted by users are influenced by the thumbnail, title, category,
and perceived popularity of each video. In our formulation, frames are associated with the videos
thumbnail and title; the decision-problem with the category; and the perceived popularity with the
underlying state. The commenting behavior (agent’s actions) is related to the number and sentiment of
the comments that result from the framing information, state, and decision-problem faced by the agent.
Based on extensive data analysis, our main take-home message (from a behavioral economics point of
view) is that YouTube users are rationally inattentive in their commenting behavior; moreover users
prefer to comment on videos that are perceived to be popular; see Sec.7 for additional conclusions.
Organization. Sec.2 introduces the problem formulation. Sec.3 discusses a deep embedded clustering
algorithm for associating the observed agent’s action to specific frames. In Sec.4 and 5, the decision
test for rational inattention with Rényi mutual information acquisition cost are provided. The tests
are constructive: they provide estimates of the utility function, information acquisition cost, and
attention strategy. Sec .6 provides Bernstein based finite sample performance bounds. Sec.7 applies
the methods to a massive YouTube dataset to characterize the commenting behavior of users. The
appendix summarizes the implementation details of the deep classifier.
2 Problem Formulation and Rational Inattention
We first describe the problem formulation first from the point of view of the rationally inattentive
agent; and then from the point of view of the observer that views the dataset generated by the agent.
Despite our abstract formulation, the reader should keep in mind the YouTube context outlined above.
Viewpoint 1. Rationally Inattentive Bayesian Agent
Assume the agent knows the finite state space X and finite action space A. The agent’s prior beliefs
of the possible states are given by the prior probability distribution µ(x), x ∈ X . The attention
function α(s|x) of the agent provides a distribution over the signals s ∈ S(α) when the state is x.
The set of possible signals S(α) for a given attention strategy α is finite. The attention function
encodes all the information (signals, private information, and measurement mechanism) available to
the agent to compute the posterior state distribution. Given the prior µ(x), and attention function
α(s|x), the Bayesian agent computes the posterior distribution as
p(x|s) = µ(x)α(s|x)∑
y∈X
µ(y)α(s|y) . (1)
The agent has utility function u(x, a) over the states x ∈ X and actions a ∈ A.
Definition 1. An agent satisfies attention rationality if it selects actions a ∈ A and attention functions
α(s|x) that satisfy the following conditions (where E denotes the expectation operator):
i) Expected Utility Maximization:
a∗ ∈ argmax
a∈A
E{u(x, a)|s} = argmax
a∈A
{∑
x∈X
p(x|s)u(x, a)
}
∀p(x|s) ∈ S(α) (2)
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ii) Attention Selection Rationality:
α∗(s|x) ∈ argmax
α
{
Es∈S(α){max
a∈A
[
∑
x∈X
p(x|s)u(x, a)]} − C(µ, α)
}
(3)
where C(µ, α) is the cost (or disutility) of attention function α when the prior distribution µ.
Eq.(2) states that the agent selects actions that are consistent with Bayesian utility maximization, and
(3) states that the agent selects the best attention strategy to maximize the gross expected utility.
Viewpoint 2. Observer’s Model and Deep Clustering of Frames
By observing the actions of the agent, the observer aims to determine if the agent is rationally
inattentive, and if so, estimate the agent’s utility function and information acquisition cost. The
observer has access to the dataset of states xt and actions at chosen by the agent for time t = 1, . . . , T :
D = {(xt, ft, at)}Tt=1. (4)
Here the parameter ft represents all the framing information immediately apparent to the agent.
Typically, framing information ft includes images, video, text, and data. In our YouTube example,
ft maps the title and thumbnail of a video to an integer representing a unique frame. Qualitatively,
different values of ft determine different action policies by the agent for a given title and thumbnail.
A major challenge when applying rational inattention theory is accounting for the agent’s framing
effects that impact the agent’s behaviour. To account for framing effects, we assume there are
{0, 1, . . . , N} possible frames. In Sec.3 a deep embedded clustering method is used to construct ft
given the title and thumbnail of the YouTube video observed at time t.
Given the set of frames, rational inattention theory aims is to determine if the dataset D is consistent
with a rational agent (Definition 1). To test for rational inattention we require estimates of the
(possibly randomized) action selection policy pi(a|x, f) and prior beliefs µ(x) of the agent. Using D
pˆi(a|x, f) =
∑T
t=1 1{xt = x, at = a, ft = f}
1{xt = x, ft = f} , µˆ(x) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
1{xt = x} (5)
are maximum likelihood estimates of these, where 1{·} is the indicator function. Given the maximum
likelihood estimates (5), Sec.4 provides a decision test for rational inattention. For agents that satisfy
the rational inattention test, methods to recover their utility function u(x, a, f), attention strategy
α(s|x), posterior distribution s(x), and information cost C(µ, α) are provided.
For a rationally inattentive agent, it is desirable to have a risk-aware method to optimize the expected
utility of the agent by adjusting their action selection policy pi(a|x, f) while keeping the attention
strategy α(s|x) (measurement device) unchanged. The expected utility of a rationally inattentive
agent for action-selection policies pi(a|x, f) = {pik(a|x, f)}Kk=1 over K decision problems is
V (pi(a|x, f)) =
K∑
k=1
∑
x∈X
∑
a∈Ak
pik(a|x, f)µ(x)u(a, x, f). (6)
In Sec.6 a penalized variance optimization method is presented for constructing action selection
policies that maximize (6). The construction uses finite sample bounds on the total expected utility.
3 Constructing Preference and Policy Invariant Frames via Deep Learning
Here a deep embedding method is provided that learns the policy invariant frames of the agent.
Specifically, a mapping of ft to nt ∈ {1, . . . , N} is constructed where for each n ∈ {1, . . . , N} the
behavior of the agent is invariant. In the YouTube social network the framing information available
to the agent is comprised of the title and thumbnail of each video. Given that agents are ordinal
preference invariant to minor variations in the title and thumbnail, it is possible to map the features ft
to one of {1, . . . , N} discrete frames learned using deep embedding.
The deep embedding method uses an autoencoder to construct the latent representation zt of ft, and
includes a clustering layer to simultaneously learn how to associate each ft to one of {1, . . . , N}
discrete frames. A schematic of the clustering method is illustrated in Fig. 1.
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Figure 1: Schematic of the deep embedded clustering method to map the framing information ft
to the discrete frame {1, . . . , N}. The parameter w(f) contains all prior knowledge of the input
framing information, ε is a Gaussian white noise term, r(f˜) is the encoder, zt is the latent space
representation of ft, g(z) represents the decoder, and fˆt is the output of the autoencoder.
The autoencoder comprises two deep neural networks, the first is the encoder that maps the input ft
to the latent space representation zt, and the second is the decoder that map the latent space represen-
tation zt to the input ft where fˆt ≈ ft. To force the encoder to learn robust latent representations,
the autoencoder is trained using corrupted versions of the input. Such an autoencoder is known as a
denoising autoencoder [37, 4]. The denoising autoencoder encodes the input into the latent space
representation, and attempts to remove the effect of the corruption process stochastically applied to
the input of the autoencoder. Removing effects of the corruption process is performed by learning
the statistical dependencies between the inputs. A detailed description of the denoising autoencoder
architecture is in the Appendix with focus on the title and thumbnail of YouTube videos.
Though the latent space representation of the input has been used extensively for clustering, such
methods are not guaranteed to preserve any intrinsic local structure of the framing data ft. To ensure
the autoencoder both minimizes the reconstruction error and maximizes the intrinsic local structure
of the data, a clustering loss is used. The loss of the deep embedded clustering method (Fig. 1) is:
L = ||s− g(f(w(s) + ε))||22 + KL(P ||Q) (7)
where KL(P ||Q) is the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence of the discrete probability distributions P
and Q. Here Q is the prior probability distribution of cluster association between the latent variables
zt and the associated frames nt. If we assume each cluster is generated from a Gaussian normal
distribution with mean Ψn, then the probability of association of each zt is given by the Student-t
distribution:
qtn =
(1 + ||zt −Ψn||2)−1)∑N
n=1(1 + ||zt −Ψn||2)−1
∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (8)
Given Q, the distribution P is designed to avoid degenerate clustering solutions which allocate most
of the frames to a few clusters or assign a cluster to a sample outlier.
ptn =
q2tn/Fn∑N
n=1(q
2
tn/Fn)
, Fn =
T∑
t=1
qtn. (9)
P (zt = n) = Fn/T is the probability that zt belonging to cluster n; Fn is the clustering frequency.
From (8) and (9), if all the data-points are associated with a specific cluster this will increase the loss
(7). Additionally, if the cluster is associated with several data points with low-confidence, this will
also increase the loss (7). Minimizing the loss (7) can be interpreted as a form of self-training as
P depends on Q. Specifically, in self-training we take an initial classifier and an unlabeled dataset,
then label the dataset with the classifier in order to train on its own high confidence predictions. This
ensures that the latent clusters are constructed to avoid outliers.
The deep embedding method that maps ft to nt ∈ {1, . . . , N} is formalized in Algorithm 2. The
pretraining step is used to initialize the encoder and decoder parameters prior to performing any
clustering. This is a critical step as the initial latent space representation of {ft}Tt=1 is used to select
the approximate locations of the N latent space cluster centers Ψo. Given the pretrained denoising
autoencoder weights, we use the Lloyd heuristic algorithm to select the locations of the N latent
space cluster centers Ψo. Given the cluster centers, the deep clustering method is applied to minimize
the loss (7) by simultaneously adjusting the cluster associations and autoencoder weights. Note that
in Algorithm 2, since the distribution P (9) depends on the weights of the encoder, we update P after
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ζ iterations. This reduces the probability of instability associated with cycling between adjusting
weights and cluster associations. The final result of Algorithm 2 is achieved when the change in
cluster associations is below a threshold δ. To ensure only frames ft that can be confidently associated
to one invariant frame, all frames that fail to satisfy max{qtn} ≤ δc are discarded.
Algorithm 1 Deep Embedded Clustering for Framing Association
Require: Set of framing information {ft}Tt=1, number of unique frames N , stopping threshold
δ ∈ (0, 1), confidence threshold δc ∈ (0, 1), and updating interval ζ.
PRETRAIN
Pretrain the denoising autoencoder without any frame association.
INITIALIZE
Initialize the N cluster centers Ψo using k-means clustering in the latent space and set ε = 0.
DEEP CLUSTERING
Train the deep clustering autoencoder and frame association layers (refer to Supporting Material).
return Invariant frames nt∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T} such that maxn{qtn} > δc.
Given the preference and policy invariant frames {nt}Tt=1, we substitute nt → ft in D (4). Using D
with the invariant frames, Sec.4 and Sec.5 illustrate how to detect if the agent is rationally inattentive
for different information cost constraints, and how to recover the utility functions.
4 Decision Test for Rational Inattention; Estimating Utility/ Attention Costs
Here we construct a decision test for rational inattention (Definition 1). The resulting preference-
based inverse reinforcement learning algorithm uses the observed stochastic choice dataset D (4) and
invariant frames {nt}Tt=1. Theorem 1 is our main result and generalizes [5, 6]:
Theorem 1. Dataset D (4) satisfies rational inattention (Definition 1) iff the action policy satisfies
pik(a|x, f) =
∑
s∈S(αk)
αk(s|x, f)ηk(a|s), S(αk) = {pk(x|a, f) : a ∈ Ak}
where the choice function ηk(a|s) is the probability of selecting action a given the posterior associated
with signal s ∈ S(αk). Additionally, one of the following two conditions must be satisfied.
i) The utility u(x, a, f) satisfies the following inequalities for decision problems k = 1, . . . ,K:∑
x∈X
pk(x|a, f)[u(x, a, f)− u(x, b, f)] ≥ 0 ∀a, b ∈ Ak ∀f ∈ {1, . . . , N}
pk(x|a, f) = µ(x)pik(a|x, f)∑
y∈X µ(y)pik(a|y, f)
(10)
Also, the attention function αk(s|x, f) for each decision problem k = 1, . . . ,K satisfies
K∑
k=1
Gk,k −Gk+1,k ≥ 0 (11)
Gk,w =
∑
s∈S(αk)
∑
x∈X
µ(x)αk(s|x, f) max
b∈Aw
{∑
x∈X
s(x)u(x, b, f)
}
αk(s|x) =
∑
a∈Ak
pik(a|x, f)1{pk(x|a, f) = s}, with AK+1 = A1.
ii) A utility function u(x, a, f) exists that satisfies the constraints
L(u(x, a, f)) for f ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} (12)
where the mixed integer linear constraint set L is defined in the Supporting Material.
In Theorem 1, (10) ensures that the attention function αk(s|x, f) and action selection policy ηk(a|s)
are consistent with the observed action-selection policy pik(a|x, f) (5). The inequalities (10) ensure
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that the agent satisfies Bayesian expected utility maximization. Intuitively, if the expected utility of
taking action a is higher then action b, then u(x, a, f) ≥ u(x, b, f). Additionally, the utility function
must satisfy “cyclical consistency” in which ordinal relation cycles such as u(x, a, f) ≥ u(x, b, f) >
u(x, c, f) > u(x, a, f) are not present. For readers familiar with revealed preference theory, this
is analogous to the GARP conditions in Afriat’s theorem [36, 7] for testing utility maximization
behavior. The constraints (3) ensures the optimal attention function is selected by the agent for each
decision problem. Qualitatively, Gk,w gives the expected utility of using attention strategy αk(s|x, f).
The constraints (20) in Theorem 1 provides a method to simultaneously test if the agent is rationally
inattentive, and to recover the ordinal utility u(x, a, f) of their associated preferences. The evaluation
involves determining if a feasible solutions exists for a set of mixed-integer linear constraints.
Notice that Theorem 1 places no restrictions on the information cost C(µ, α) of using attention
function α when the prior is µ. That is, if the constraints (20) are satisfied then the constraints
Gk,k − C(µ, αk) ≥ Gw,k − C(µ, αw) ∀k,w ∈ {1, . . . ,K} (13)
are guaranteed to be feasible. The constraints (13) ensure that the selected attention function αk
is optimal for the associated decision problem (X , µ, pik(a|x, f),Ak). The constraints (13) can be
used to recover set valued estimates of cost structure of the attention functions via a set of linear
constraints, refer to the Supporting Material.
5 Rényi Entropy Information Acquisition Cost for Rational Inattention
In this section we impose a specific structure to the information acquisition cost which defines the
attention strategy of a rationally inattentive agent. Sims’ pioneering work [31] uses Shannon mutual
information, here the more general Rényi mutual information is considered. The Rényi mutual
information between the prior µ(x) of the state and the selected attention strategy αk(s|x) is
Iβ(µ, αk) =

1
β − 1 ln
(∑
x∈X
∑
a∈A
pβ(x, a)
µβ−1(x)pβ−1(a)
)
β ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞)
I(µ, αk) β = 1
− ln
(∑
x∈X
∑
a∈A
µ(x)p(a)1{p(x, a) > 0}
)
β = 0
(14)
where β ∈ [0,∞) is the Rényi order. An important feature of (14) is that for β ∈ [0, 1] the information
constraint is convex in the arguments p(x, a) and µ(x)p(a), and for β > 1 the information constraint
is convex in µ(x)p(a) and quasi-convex in p(x, a) [34, 14, 43].
The Rényi entropy is useful for measuring the information acquisition cost since the parameter β
allows one to adjust the sensitivity of the cost to the shape of µ(x) and αk(s|x). Indeed, Rényi
entropy of order β includes the Hartley entropy, Shannon entropy, collision entropy and min entropy
as special cases. In terms of (2), the Rényi information cost constrained decision problem is
p∗k(x, a) ∈ argmax
p(x,a)
{ ∑
a∈Ak
∑
x∈X
p(x, a)u(x, a)
}
s.t. µ(x) =
∑
a∈Ak
p(x, a) ∀x ∈ X
Iβ(µ, αk) ≤ κmax, p(x, a) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X , a ∈ Ak. (15)
In (15), κmax represents the maximum “effort” the agent is willing to invest to estimate the state
x ∈ X prior to taking the action a ∈ Ak in decision problem k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Given that the objective function is linear and the constraint set is convex in (15) for β ∈ [0, 1], neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the agent to satisfy rational inattention with the Rényi information
cost constraint can be constructed using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. Formally:
Theorem 2. A rationally inattentive agent with utility function u(x, a), observed joint-distribution
p(x, a), and β ∈ (0, 1) satisfies Rényi mutual information cost (14) if and only if there exists constants
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λ1 > 0 and λ2 that satisfy the linear constraints
u(x, a) =
λ1
β − 1η
β−1(x, a)E[ηβ−1(x, a)]− λ2
1
β − 1 ln
(
E[ηβ−1(x, a)]
)
= κmax, η(x, a) =
p(x|a)
p(x)
(16)
for all x ∈ X , a ∈ A where E[·] is the expected value taken over the joint-distribution p(x, a).
In Theorem 2, λ1, λ2 are KKT multipliers of the Rényi cost information constraint and equality
constraint in (15). Combining the linear equality constraints in Theorem 2 with the mixed integer
linear program (20), yields a test for the Rényi information cost constraint and provides estimates
of the associated utility function of the agent. Thus we have constructed a preference based inverse
reinforcement learning algorithm for the utility and information acquisition cost of a Bayesian agent.
6 Finite Sample Performance Analysis of the Agent’s Action-Selection Policy
Thus far we have constructed estimates for an agent’s utility function and information acquisition
cost by observing the agents behavior. Indeed, the maximum likelihood estimate of the agent’s
action-selection policy is pˆi(a|x, f) (5). An important question related to performance analysis of
these estimators is: How far is the net utility obtained using this estimated policy (based on a finite
dataset) compared to the actual net utility V (pi(a|x, f)) (6) which uses the true policy pi(a|x, f)?
Using an extension of the empirical Bernstein inequality to the space of continuous function classes
FΠ = {fpi,k : X ×Ak ×N → [0, 1]}, fpi,k = Mpik(a|x, f)
pˆik(a|x, f)u(x, a, f) = Mu¯(pik(a|x, f)) (17)
we can construct a finite sample bound between the observed net utility V (pˆi(a|x, f)) and an estimate
of the net utility V (pi(a|x, f)) for the unobserved policy pi(a|x, f). In (17), M is a normalization
constant which ensures fpi,k ∈ [0, 1], pˆik(a|x, f) is the observed policy (5), and pik(a|x, f) is an
unobserved policy. By bounding the function class (17) using the uniform covering number and
employeeing the double-sampling method [2], Theorem 3 results.
Theorem 3. Let u¯(pik) be a random variable with Tk i.i.d. samples in D. Then with probability
1 − γ the random vector (at, xt) ∼ pik, for a stochastic hypothesis class pik ∈ Π, Tk ≥ 16, and
λ =
√
18 ln(10N∞{1/Tk,FΠ, 2Tk}/γ), satisfies
V (pik) ≤ Vˆ (pik) + λ
√
Var[u¯(pik)]
Tk
+
15λ2
18M(Tk − 1) (18)
where N∞{1/Tk,FΠ, 2Tk}/γ) is the uniform covering number.
Theorem 3 provides a probabilistic bound between the estimated net utility Vˆ (pik) and actual net
utility V (pik) that only depends on the dataset D and the coefficient λ. Therefore, for constructing the
true policy pi(a|x, f), one would maximize the net utility Vˆ (pik) while minimizing the variance term
with a coefficient λ¯ ≥ 0. Note that in Theorem 3 λ encodes the entropy of the function class FΠ,
which is dependent on the number of samples Tk, uniform covering number N∞{·}, and γ which is
a measure of the confidence of the estimate. For the function class (17), N∞{·} is polynomial in the
sample size Tk [25, 35, 29]–this ensures as the sample size increases that Vˆ (pik)→ V (pik).
Using the insights from Theorem 3, the mixed integer-linear program
pi(a|x, f) ∈ arg max
pik∈Π

K∑
k=1
V (pik(a|x, f))− λ¯k
√
Var[u¯(pik(a|x, f))]
Tk

s.t.
∑
a∈Ak
pik(a|x, f) = 1, pik(a|x, f) ≥ 0
L(u(a, x, f), pik(a|x, f)) ∀x ∈ X ,∀a ∈ Ak,∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},∀f ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (19)
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can be used to construct the optimal policy pik(a|x, f) that maximizes the net utility V (pi(a|x, f))
while ensuring the policy is consistent with rational inattention. The regularization term λ¯k in (19)
balances the maximization of the net utility V (pi(a|x, f)) while accounting for the finite-sample
variance associated with estimating V (pi(a|x, f)) for policies pi(a|x, f) that are different from
pˆi(a|x, f). The lower the value of λ¯k, the more risk-seeking the generated optimal policy.
7 Rational Inattention & Utility Maximization in YouTube Social Network
Constructing utility based preference models for how users interact and consume content in online
social media platforms is important in social network analysis [18, 22]. YouTube is an interesting
example of a social network since the interaction between users includes video content. Users interact
on YouTube channels by posting comments and rating videos. Extensive empirical studies [18, 22, 1,
16, 15, 3] show that comments and ratings from users are influenced by the thumbnail, title, category,
and perceived popularity of each video. Here we consider a massive YouTube dataset comprising 6
million videos across 25,000 channels and over a millions users from April 2007 to May 2015. As is
typical in behavioral economics [38], by user behavior, we mean the average commenting behavior
per YouTube channel, averaged over all the channels.
First, we constructed ordinal preference invariant frames using deep embedded clustering Algorithm 2.
Recall that Algorithm 2 maps the high dimensional title and thumbnail space to one of N unique
frames. Here we chose N = 4 and the embedding space to have dimension 200. The shape of the
resulting embedding space is displayed in Fig. 2. Selecting N = 4 ensures each video is sufficiently
isolated to a particular frame; less than 3% of videos are classified ambiguously in terms of frames.
Figure 2: t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbour visu-
alization of the latent space representation of title
and thumbnail constructed using Algorithm 2 for
the YouTube videos contained in the dataset D.
The association of each video to the four prefer-
ence invariant frames is illustrated by four colors
(red, blue, green, purple).
Next, for each of the preference invariant frames
in Fig. 2, we apply the rational inattention test to
determine if users are rationally inattentive. We
find that the commenting behaviour of users in
YouTube is consistent with rational inattention
for a general cost constraint. The ordinal utility
of the users in each unique frame is provided in
Fig. 3. As expected, the commenting behaviour
of the users is different between each frame. Ad-
ditionally, the users prefer to comment on videos
that are expected to have a higher popularity
compared with videos with lower popularity. If
we impose the Rényi information cost constraint,
we find that only the commenting behaviour in
frame f = 4 is rationally inattentive. The associ-
ated utility however provides no clear preference
ordering between the popularity of the video and
the associated commenting behaviour. This sug-
gests that users are rationally inattentive with
respect to a general information cost constraint.
Discussion. From a behavioral economics point of view, the above results yield useful insight into
user behavior in online social multimedia. Based on extensive analysis of the YouTube dataset, our
main conclusions are that users commenting behavior (number of comments and comment sentiment)
is i) consistent with rational inattention, ii) depends on the framing information available iii) users
prefer to comment on videos that are perceived to be popular, iv) the category of the video influences
the commenting behavior; see Supporting Material. That deep clustering adequately captures framing
information, and that a preference based utility with attention costs rationalizes the YouTube dataset
is remarkable. We speculate that this approach can be used to predict popularity of YouTube channels.
There is also considerable scope to generalize the utility function estimation described in this paper
to stopping time problems involving partially observed Markov decision processes [20, 21].
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Figure 3: Utility function u(x, a, f) of the rationally inattentive agents with a general information
cost structure for each of the four unique frames in Fig. 2. Though the commenting preferences
depend on the frame, the agent prefers to comment on videos with higher perceived popularity. The
utility is constructed be evaluating the mixed-integer linear program (20) with the YouTube dataset
D. x represents the state, a the possible actions, f the frame, and the decision-problem k indicates
the most popular category (black bars) and the other categories (gray bars); see Appendix.
A Appendix. Denoising Autoencoder Architecture for YouTube Title and
Thumbnail
A detailed description of the steps in the deep embedding method for constructing the preference
invariant frames is provided in Algorithm 1, reproduced here in greater detail then in the main
paper. The denoising autoencoder is comprised of stacked long short term memory (LSTM) and
convolutional neural network (CNN) which are detailed in Sec.A.1 and Sec.A.2. To ensure the
denoising autoencoder is robust to variations in the title and thumbnail input (e.g. good generalization
performance), we introduce noise into the input training data. Possible methods to introduce noise
into the network include using drop-out [32] and drop-path [17] methods. Here we apply Gaussian
noise to the input images and numeric representation of the words, and additionally include drop-out
layers in the LSTM and CNN networks.
Algorithm 2 Deep Embedded Clustering for Framing Association
Require: Set of framing information {ft}Tt=1, number of unique frames N , stopping threshold
δ ∈ (0, 1), confidence threshold δc ∈ (0, 1), and updating interval ζ.
PRETRAIN
Pretrain the denoising autoencoder without any frame association.
INITIALIZE
Initialize the N cluster centers Ψo using k-means clustering in the latent space and set ε = 0.
DEEP CLUSTERING
Train the deep clustering autoencoder and frame association layers.
i = 0
while
∑
t n
o
t 6= nit ≥ Tδ do
if i%ζ == 0 then
Compute all latent points {zt = r(w(ft))}Tt=1
Compute P using (9)
Set no = ni
Compute new cluster labels nit = arg maxn∈{1,...,N}{qin}.
else
Select mini-batch sample from {ft}Tt=1 and update the weights of the autoencoder and
frame association layers to minimize the loss (7).
end if
i = i+ 1
end while
return Invariant frames nt ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T} such that maxn{qtn} > δc.
A.1 Text Processing of the YouTube Title
The design of autoencoders for text data is challenging as a result of the power-law distribution of
words and the long-range dependencies (grammars) between words. To address these challenges, we
use previously constructed word embeddings to convert the words into a numeric vector. We then
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employ a LSTM networks for the encoder and decoder blocks of the autoencoder which focus on text
processing. The combination of using word embeddings and LSTMs allows the network to utilize
prior knowledge of similar words while simultaneously learning how to cluster similar sentences into
a unique frame.
Prior to transforming the words into their numeric embedding, we apply a lemmatization transforma-
tion. Lemmatization reduces the number of variations of words necessary to consider as it groups all
the inflected forms a word into a single base representation. For example, the verb “to walk” may
appear as “walk”, “walked”, “walks”, “walking” which are all converted to “walk” via the lemmatiza-
tion transformation. To perform the lemmatization transformation we use the WordNet lemmatizer 1.
The WordNet lemmatizer is comprised of two resources, a set of rules which identify the inflectional
endings that can be detached from individual words, and a list of exceptions for irregular word forms.
WordNet first checks the exceptions, then remove any inflectional endings from the words. Having
performed the lemmatization operation, we now construct numeric vector representations of the
words. A popular method to perform this task is to use distributed representations of words (e.g.
word embeddings). The distributed representation of words in a vector space are designed such
that words with similar semantic meaning have similar latent space representations. Equivalently,
words with similar meaning will cluster tgeother in the word embedding space. Two popular word
embeddings are the Word2Vec [26] and Glove [28] models. For the clustering algorithm we use
the Glove embedding that was constructed using over 2 billion tweets and is comprised of over 1.2
million words. The possible dimension of the word embedding space is 25, 50, 100, or 200. Here we
use a word embedding dimension of 25.
Given the word embeddings of the sentence w(f), we use an LSTM encoder-decoder framework
to learn latent space representations of the titles [10, 33, 11, 9]. To construct the latent space
representation of the sentences, we utilize a stacked LSTM architecture. Note that stacked LSTMs are
able to capture grammatical information in the title at different scales. It was illustrated in [10, 33]
that stacked LSTMs tend to have superior predictive performance compared to single layer LSTMs
for natural language processing tasks.
A.2 Image Processing of the YouTube Thumbnail
In the denoising autoencoder, image processing is performed using a VGG based architecture. Given
the latent space representation zt from the encoder, the image decoder is used to reconstruct the
original input image. To perform this task requires the use of deconvolution and upsampling layers.
However, deconvolution layers are not used in CNN autoencoders. Instead a mixture of convolutional
and upsampling layers are employed. In the most extreme case, a single upsampling layer can be
used to directly reconstruct the images from the latent space as illustrated in [23]. A commonly
used method is to construct multiple transposed convolution (also known as fractionally strided
convolutions) layers in combination with upsampling layers. Using the transposed convolution layers
instead of the standard convolution layers ensures that “checkerboard” artifacts are removed from the
decoded image [27].
B Constraint Set L(u(x, a, f) for Rational Inattention (Theorem 1) and
Recovery of Utility and Information Cost
To construct the utility function u(x, a, f) of the agent for the observed stochastic dataset D (4)
requires that the utility satisfies the inequalities (10) for Bayesian utility maximization, and (11) for
attention function maximization. The utility function u(x, a, f) of a rationally inattentive agent must
1https://wordnet.princeton.edu/wordnet/
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satisfy the following mixed-integer linear constraints:∑
x∈X
pk(x|a, f)[u(x, a, f)− u(x, b, f)] ≥ 0 (20)
K∑
k=1
∑
a∈Ak
pk(a, f)mk(a, f)−
∑
a∈Ak+1
pk+1(a, f)nk+1(a, f)
 ≥ 0
mk(a, b, f) =
∑
x∈X
pk(a|x, f)u(x, b, f)
mk(a, f) ≥ mk(a, b, f) ∀a, b ∈ Ak
mk(a, f) ≤ mk(a, b, f)M (1− δb,f ),
∑
b∈Ak
δb,f = 1
nk+1(a, f) ≥ mk+1(a, b, f) ∀a ∈ Ak+1 ∀b ∈ Ak
nk+1(a, f) ≤ mk+1(a, b, f)M (1− ζb,f ),
∑
b∈Ak
ζb,f = 1
u(x, a) ∈ [0, 1], δb,k, ζb,k ∈ {0, 1}
∀a, b ∈ Ak, c ∈ Ak+1, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}
with AK+1 = A1 and M a large constant. To determine if a u(x, a, f) exists for the constraint set
can be evaluated using a variety of numerical methods including branch-and-bound, cutting planes,
branch-and-cut, and branch-and-price [8].
Given the utility function u(x, a, f) from the solution of (12), and the inequality relation (13), an
ordinal estimate of the associated cost of information C(µ, αk) of each attention strategy αk can be
constructed. Specifically, the ordinal cost of information C(µ, αk) can be computed by solving the
following linear program:
Gk,k −Gw,k ≥ C(µ, αk)− C(µ, αw)
C(µ, αk) ≥ 0∀w, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (21)
Recall that if a solution to (12) exists, then a solution to (21) is guaranteed to exist from Theorem 1
and (3). Notice that if the cost of a particular attention strategy is zero, then absolute bounds can be
placed on the information cost of each attention strategy. For example if C(µ, αw) = 0, then the cost
C(µ, αk) ∈ [Gk,w −Gw,w, Gk,k −Gw,k]. The estimated cost function satisfies weak monotonicity
in information–that is, if the attention function provides more information then it will have a higher
information cost. However, it may be the case that the actual cost of information used by the agent
does not satisfy this condition. In fact, only requiring rational inattention with no further restrictions
on information cost does not impose any testable conditions for information monotonicity.
C Estimating the Agent’s Attention Function and Choice Function
If the dataset D satisfies rational inattention, it is also possible to estimate the agent’s attention
function αk(s|x) and choice function ηk(a|s).
To construct the agent’s attention function αk(s|x) and choice function ηk(a|s) requires the posterior
distribution pk(x|a). First, consider the signal set S(αk) of all observed posterior state distributions
of the agent for attention function αk(s|x) using
S(αk) = {pk(x|a) : a ∈ Ak}, pk(x|a) = µ(x)pik(a|x)∑
y∈X µ(y)pik(a|y)
. (22)
Each posterior distribution pk(x|a) is associated with a single signal s ∈ S(αk). The posterior
distribution pk(x|a) in (22) is equal to the true posterior distribution pk(x|s) in (1) only if the choice
function ηk(a|s) produces a single action a ∈ Ak for each s ∈ S(αk) with probability one. Otherwise
the posterior distribution pk(x|a) is given by the weighted sum
pk(x|a) =
∑
s∈S(αk) ηk(a|s)pk(x|s)pk(s)∑
x∈X
∑
s∈S(αk) ηk(a|s)pk(x|s)pk(s)
. (23)
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Note that without explicit knowledge of the choice and attention functions of the agent, the stochastic
choice dataset can not be used to determine if pk(x|a) = pk(x|s). Having pk(x|a) = pk(x|s) is not
required to determine if the agent satisfies rational inattention.
Given pk(x|a), for each signal s ∈ S(αk), the associated attention function is
αk(s|x) =
∑
a∈Ak
ηk(a|s)αk(s|x) =
∑
a∈Ak
pik(a|x)1{pk(x|a) = s} (24)
where the second equality results from using the data matching condition in Theorem 1. Note that (24)
is only equal to the agent’s attention function ρk(r|x) if the observed and true posterior distributions
are equal. If ρk(r|x) is the true attention function then
αk(s|x) =
∑
r∈S(ρk)
∑
a∈Ak
ηk(a|r)ρk(r|x)1{pk(x|a) = s}. (25)
It must be the case that the observed attention strategy αk(s|x) is weakly less informative than the
true attention strategy ρk(r|x). Equivalently, the observed attention strategy is a noisy version of
the true attention strategy. Theorem 1 however does not require we know the true attention strategy
ρk(r|x) of the agent to test if the agent’s behavior satisfies rational inattention.
The observed choice function of the agent is given by
ηk(a|s) =
∑
x∈X µ(x)pik(a|x)∑
b∈Ak
∑
x∈X µ(x)pik(b|x)1{pk(x|b) = s}
(26)
which is merely the ratio of the number of times action a ∈ Ak was selected over all other possible
actions b ∈ Ak for the prior distribution s ∈ S(αk). The observed choice function provides no
information on the true choice function over the posterior distributions r ∈ Γ(ρk) that result from the
true attention function unless the actual and observed posterior distributions are equal. Note however
that the observed attention function αk(s|x) (24) and choice function ηk(a|s) (26) are consistent with
the agent’s observed action-selection policy pik(a|x) as required in the data matching requirement of
Theorem 1.
D YouTube Dataset and Definition of the Frames, Context, Action, and
Decision-Problem
To construct D, we use the real-world YouTube dataset comprising 6 million videos across 25,000
channels from April 2007 to May 2015. The YouTube data contains the view counts, comment counts,
likes, dislikes, thumbnail, title, and category of each video. The frame instance ft of each video is
comprised of the video’s thumbnail and title. Specifically, we use a 40 × 80 pixel color image to
represent the thumbnail (which is a resized version of the native 246× 138 pixel thumbnails used in
YouTube). For the title, we only include the first 8 words of the title in the framing instance ft (over
90% of the videos have a title of length 8 words or less). The top category of videos in the YouTube
dataset is “Gaming” which comprises 44% of all the videos. Two decision-problems are considered
in the dataset. The first is k = 1 which is associated with all videos that have category “Gaming”,
while decision-problem k = 2 results for videos that are not associated with the “Gaming” category.
The state xt of each video is associated with the viewcount of the video 14 days after the video was
published. Specifically, state x = 1 is high viewcount where the viewcount is above 10,000 views,
while x = 2 results otherwise. The associated action at is related to the commenting behavior of the
agents, which is computed using the comment counts, like count, and dislike count 2 days after the
video is published. The possible actions a = 1 is low comment count with negative sentiment, a = 2
is low comment count with neutral sentiment, a = 3 is low comment count with positive sentiment,
a = 4 is high comment count with negative sentiment, a = 5 is high comment count with neutral
sentiment, and a = 6 is high comment count with positive sentiment. Here negative sentiment results
if the difference in like count and dislike count is below -25, neutral sentiment if the difference is
between -25, 25, and has positive sentiment if the difference is above 25. A low comment count is
considered if there are less then 100 comments, and high otherwise.
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